Abstract-This paper presents a formulation and an algorithm for the winner determination problem in auction-based scheduling. Without imposing a time line discretization, the proposed approach allows bidders to bid for the processing of a set of jobs using a requirement-based bidding language, which naturally represents scheduling constraints. The proposed winner determination algorithm uses a depth first branch and bound search. The search branches on bids, and a constraint-directed scheduling procedure is used at each node to verify the feasibility of the temporary schedule. Experiments show that the proposed algorithm is on average more than an order of magnitude faster than a commercial optimization package, CPLEX 10.0.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE INTERNET has presented tremendous potential in changing the way companies buy and sell goods, integrate their supply chains, and collaborate with their business partners. eMarkets are now emerging as a means of achieving greater efficiency in today's globalized economic environment. Among various protocols governing the negotiation between eMarket participants, auctions are a successful multilateral negotiation protocol and account for an enormous volume of transactions on the Internet [1] . In many auctions, the goods to be sold are processing times of resources, e.g., landing timeslots of airport runways [2] , machine processing times of a factory [3] , computation and network accessing times of Internet resources [4] , and the right to use railroad tracks [5] , [6] . In these settings, auctions are used as a scheduling mechanism to assign resource times to bidders. We refer to the type of auctions designed for scheduling problems as auction-based scheduling.
In auction-based scheduling, bidders' valuations often exhibit complementarities. For example, due to scheduling constraints, a bidder may need to obtain a set of specific combinations of time periods on resources to process its jobs. The complementarities of bidders' valuations present particular challenges for the design of bidding languages in terms of expressiveness, conciseness, and naturalness. Logical languages, which use either logical combinations of items as formulas (L G ) [7] or logical combinations of bundles as formulas (L B ) [8] , have been proposed to address this challenge. However, these languages cannot be applied directly to scheduling problems because they are designed for auctioning discrete goods, not goods that exhibit continuity, such as processing times on resources. In order to apply L B , the scheduling timeline of resources needs to be discretized into fixed time units, and these units are treated as distinct items sold in the auctions [3] , [9] . With timeline discretization, bidders can express their timerelated scheduling requirements, such as release times and due dates indirectly by attaching values to time units combinations. However, this approach can generate a large number of items to be sold in the auction. For example, a one-week time window on ten resources can be discretized into more than 100 000 time units if the time accuracy we need is in minutes (which is a reasonable requirement in many scheduling domains). Generally speaking, in combinatorial auctions the number of bids is exponential in the number of the items to be sold. A large number of items can inflict heavy burdens on the auction in terms of bids evaluation, communication, and winner determination.
An alternative to the timeline discretization approach is to design languages, which allow agents to directly express their time requirements and the values associated. We refer to these types of languages as requirement-based languages (denoted by L R ). L R enable agents to explicitly express their time-related requirements without specifying the values on the combinations of resource time units. For example, in a train scheduling auction setting, Parkes and Ungar [6] designed a requirement-based language, which allows train agents to specify the accessing and leaving time on a railroad track in their bids. Comparing with L B , L R languages do not require timeline discretization and, therefore, save the bidders' computation on the evaluation of the combinations of resource time units. However, as stated in Theorem 1 (Section II-B), the winner determination problems (WDPs) formulated using L R remain NP-hard.
This paper is concerned with the computational challenges of WDPs formulated using L R in the context of auctionbased scheduling. As one cannot hope for a general-purpose algorithm that can efficiently solve every instance of the WDP [10] , we propose a scheduling domain specific winner determination algorithm using a constraint-based scheduling approach for the node feasibility validation in a bid-driven branch and bound search (BBS) procedure. In this paper, we do not discuss the concern that bidders might not report their true valuations because of strategic considerations. The WDP is assumed to be inherited from some mechanisms, such as Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism or an iterative implementation of VCG.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II formulates the WDP in auction-based scheduling using two types of bidding languages L B and L R . In Sections III and IV, we propose a constraint-based winner determination algorithm for the L R WDP formulation and compare our algorithm with CPLEX 10.0 on a suite of benchmark testing problems. We further refine the algorithm in Section V. Section VI concludes this paper and points out future research directions.
II. WDP FORMULATIONS FOR AUCTION-BASED SCHEDULING
The structure of the WDP in combinatorial auctions is affected by the bidding languages adopted. In this section, we formulate the WDP for auction-based scheduling using the general bidding languages L B and the scheduling specific bidding languages L R . As auction-based scheduling is a type of combinatorial auction (due to the complementarities of bidder's valuations), for the sake of completeness, we start by briefly introducing combinatorial auctions.
A. Preliminaries on Combinatorial Auctions
Auctions are a mediated negotiation process that allocates goods to bidders. Combinatorial auctions are those auctions in which bidders can place bids on combinations of items, called "bundles," rather than just individual items. The advantage of combinatorial auctions is that bidders can more fully express their preferences. This is particularly important when items are complements, i.e., a set of items has greater value than the sum of the values for the individual items. For example, a pair of shoes is worth more than the value of a left shoe alone plus the value of a right shoe alone. Allowing bidders more fully to express preferences often leads to improved economic efficiency and greater auction revenues.
However, alongside their advantages, combinatorial auctions raise many questions and challenges. An important one is the high computation demanded for winner determination. Given a set of bids in a combinatorial auction, the WDP is to find an allocation of items to bidders (the auctioneer can keep some of the items) that maximizes the auctioneer's revenue, and no items are assigned to more than one bidder. The problem is inherently complex. Specifically, it is NP-hard [11] , meaning that a polynomial-time algorithm that is guaranteed to compute the optimal allocation is unlikely to exist. Even worse, the problem is not uniformly approximable, in the following sense: Almost certainly there does not exist a polynomial-time algorithm and a constant d that, for all inputs, the algorithm produces an answer that is at least 1/d of the correct optimal answer [10] . Different bidding languages adopted by a combinatorial auction may result in fundamentally different WDP formulations. General bidding languages proposed in the literature use either logical combinations of items as formulas (L G ) or logical combinations of bundles as formulas (L B ). L G languages allow bids that are logical formulas where items are taken as atomic propositions and combined using logical connectives. L B lan- guages use bundles of items with associated prices as atomic propositions and combines them using logical connectives. In auction-based scheduling, the outcomes of an auction are schedules, which allocate time units of resources to bidders' jobs. For a specific schedule, a bidder attaches his/her value to the package of all time units included in a schedule (not the individual time unit). In the auction-based scheduling literature, bundle languages L B have been used to represent schedules [3] , [9] . We present the WDP formulation for auction-based scheduling using L B in the following section.
B. WDP Formulation Using L B
To illustrate the idea of formulating auction-based scheduling using L B , we first present an example, which is a slight modification of the factory scheduling economy example adopted in [3] . Consider an unscheduled day shift of a factory (as shown in Fig. 1 ), which is divided into eight one-h time units, labeled 9:00 to 16:00 according to their respective end times. In this example, 1 h is the basic time unit, which cannot be further divided. Units are treated as distinct items that can be allocated for the production of customer orders. Assume that each customer has one single-operation job to be completed. A customer's job is defined by its duration (length), its release time (the time when the job is available for processing), its deadline, and the valuation the customer places on the job (expressed in dollars). To complete his/her job, the customer must acquire a number of time units no less than the length (not necessarily contiguous, preemption is allowed in this example), within its feasible time window, which is the time period between its release time and its deadline.
For this example, we may construct an auction in which a customer can bid any combination of time units (with the sum of units equal or greater than the length of its job) within his/her feasible time window. For example, customer 1 can submit four XOR bids which are {9, 10, 11}, {10, 11, 12}, {9, 11, 12}, and {9, 10, 12}. In this case, the WDP is to allocate time units to customers such that no unit is allocated to more than one customer, no customer receives more than one bid, and the revenue (sum of winning customers' valuations) is maximized.
In the aforementioned example, we have treated each timestamped unit as a distinct item to be sold in the auction. By doing this, we convert a scheduling problem to a combinatorial auction problem. In the following, we present the standard WDP formulation for combinatorial auction problems and analyze its complexity in the context of auction-based scheduling.
Let Ω be the set of time units of resources (goods to be sold). For every subset B of Ω, let price j (B) be the price that the bidder j (j = 1, . . . , n) is willing to pay for B. Let x j (B) = 1 if the bundle B ⊆ Ω is allocated to bidder j and zero otherwise. The problem can be formulated as an integer programming
subject to
In auction-based scheduling, the number of feasible bids that a bidder can submit is restricted by the scheduling constraints, such as release time, deadline, and number of time units that a bidder needs to process its job. For example, in Fig. 1 , bidder 1 will not bid on the time units after his/her deadline (12:00) because any time unit after 12:00 has no value to him/her. If a job cannot be interrupted during processing, we can further restrict the feasible bids by requiring that a bidder can bid only on time units that are adjacent. However, even with the scheduling constraints, as shown in the following theorem, the WDP remains NP-hard.
Theorem 1: The WDP remains NP-hard even if we restrict to instances where the items to be sold are a set of linearly ordered time slots of a single resource; a bid has only one operation to be scheduled on the resource between its release time, r j and deadline, d j ; preemption is not allowed; all operations have identical processing time τ ; and
Proof: To show that the WDP with restrictions is NP-hard, we prove that its decision version is NP-complete by constructing a polynomially computable reduction from the following variation of the job interval selection problem (JISP), which is NP-complete [12] . Given a set of J = {J 1 , J 2 , . . . , J n } jobs in a JISP, each of which requires the same execution time τ , and J j may be started for execution at any of a set of given discrete starting times S j = {s j , . . . , s j + k j } where k j ≤ 2, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we can construct an instance of the WDP as follows. The bidder j has job J j to be executed with the release time r j = s j and deadline d j = s j + k j + τ . v j is the price that the bidder j is willing to pay for any bundles that satisfy its constraints. Because
Answering the question, if the WDP has a solution with revenue V , is equivalent to solving the NPcomplete JISP.
The time discretization approach allows the WDP in auctionbased scheduling to be formulated using the general bidding language L B . However, L B normally requires a large number of bids to represent a bidder's preferences in auction-based scheduling. As mentioned in Section I, a one-week time window on ten resources can be discretized into more than 100 000 thousand time units to be sold. In combinatorial auctions, for a bidder, the number of nonempty bids to be submitted is 2 r − 1, where r is the number of items to be sold. To fully express his/her preferences over the combinations of the 100 000 thousand time units using L B , a bidder will have 2 10 5 − 1 bids to be submitted in this particular case. According to Theorem 1, the WDP remains NP-hard with scheduling domain restrictions. A large number of bids lead to larger problem size, which demands exponentially growing computation time.
To deal with this problem, we introduce a scheduling specific family of bidding languages, called requirement-based languages (L R ), in which the atomic propositions attach prices to the performance requirements of processing a job rather than items (as in L G ) or a bundle of items (as in L B ). The requirement can be the completion time of the job or other scheduling objectives.
C. Requirement-Based Bidding Language
A good bidding language for a problem domain needs to capture the intrinsic structure of the problem, such that bidders' valuations can be expressed naturally and concisely using the language. In auction-based scheduling, bidders derive values based on the levels at which their performance requirements have been satisfied. Based on this valuation structure, we present a type of requirement-based bidding language in which atomic propositions attach prices to the completion time requirements of processing jobs. We call the language completion time-based L R .
An atomic proposition of the completion time-based L R consists of a set of jobs to be scheduled, the required completion time before which the jobs need to be completed, and the price that the bidder is willing to pay. We refer to this atomic proposition as completion time-based bid (CBid).
CBid is a four-tuple J, C max , lft, p where J is a set containing the descriptions of the jobs and constraints; C max defines that the measure of performance being used is makespan (completion time of all jobs in J); lf t is the completion time required and p is the price that the bidder is willing to pay for C max ≤ lf t. CBids can also be connected by logical connectives. For example, if a bidder is willing to pay $100 for the guarantee of completing its jobs before 4:00 P.M. or $60 for completing its job before 6:00 P.M., the bidder can express this valuation by submitting an XOR-CBid J, C max , 4:00 P.M., $100 XOR J, C max , 6:00 P.M., $60 .
D. WDP Formulation Using L R
In the L R model, the WDP involves the selection of a subset of CBids such that the sum of the prices of the selected bids is maximized and all scheduling constraints are satisfied. L R WDP is different from the job shop scheduling problem model studied in classical scheduling theory. It is assumed in the job shop model that all jobs need to be included in the final schedule. L R WDP expands the job shop model by adding the winner determination part to it. In L R WDP, not only jobs need to be scheduled, the set of winning bids needs to be determined at the same time. We formulate the L R WDP by incorporating scheduling specific modeling techniques into the general combinatorial auction problem structure.
We consider a class of the WDPs for auction-based scheduling, which consist of a set of n bidders. Each bidder j (j = 1, . . . , n) requires the processing of a job, which consists of a sequence of operations o j,k (k = 1, . . . , n j ). An operation o j,k (j = 1, . . . , n, k = 1, . . . , n j ) has a specified processing time P j,k ∈ R + , and its execution requires the exclusive use of a designated resource for the duration of its processing. There are precedence constraints among operations of a job, i.e., o j,k must precede o j,k+1 . If o j,k and o l,m need to be processed on the same resource q j,k,l,m = 1, otherwise q j,k,l,m = 0. A bidder j has a job release time r j after which the job is available for processing. The performance requirement of processing the job of bidder j is defined by the job's completion time d j , by which the job needs to be finished. v j is the price that bidder j is willing to pay for his/her job to be completed before d j . In this case, a bid submitted to the auction can be represented using a CBid J, C max , d j , v j . The WDP involves the selection of a subset of bids such that the scheduling constraints for all selected bids are satisfied and at the same time, the sum of bid prices is maximized. Let 
where
, and m = 1, . . . , n l . The set of constraints (6) and (7) ensures that the operations of a job do not start before its release time and finish after its completion time. The set of constraints (8) ensure that an operation does not start before the previous operation of the same job is completed. The set of constraints (9) is a set of logical constraints saying: if two bidders j and l are selected in the schedule, and operations S j,k and S l,m are to be processed on the same resource (q j,k,l,m = 1), and
These constraints ensure that, at most, one operation can be processed by a particular resource at a time, where H is a large positive constant, which is used for the linearization of the logical constraint "if." Explanation on how this "large positive constant technique" is used in scheduling problem formulation can be found in [32] . The minimum value of H depends on the problem instance. In general, a H = max(d j ) + max(p j,k ), where j = 1, . . . , n and k = 1, . . . , n j , is large enough to enforce the logical "if" constraint. Constraints (10) and (11) (12)- (14) are nonnegative and integer constraints.
In this L R WDP formulation, the number of bids in a WDP is the number of jobs to be processed, which is usually much smaller than 2 r − 1 where r is the number of time units to be sold. Therefore, in terms of the number of bids in the problem, the size of the WDP formulated using L R can be much smaller than that formulated using L B . In the following section, we develop a constraint-based branch and bound algorithm for optimal winner determination for the WDPs formulated using L R .
III. CONSTRAINT-BASED WINNER DETERMINATION
For optimal winner determination, branch and bound algorithms are often used. A branch and bound algorithm for the WDP can branch on items [13] , [14] or to branch on bids [15] . For the WDPs formulated by L R , we propose a BBS algorithm which branches on bids.
A. Branching Structure of BBS
The algorithm is a depth-first tree search. Fig. 2 shows a three bids search tree of BBS. The search starts with an empty temporal schedule, TEMP. Along the path TEMP is expended by adding more bids form AV, which is a set that contains no winning bids. The best TEMP found so far is denoted by T EMP * . sum is the revenue of TEMP, which is the summation of prices of bids in TEMP, and sum * is the revenue of T EMP * . h is an upper bound on how much the bids in AV can contribute in terms of the value of the objective function of the WDP. Along the search path, the algorithm needs to check the feasibility of TEMP after a new node is added. If the current TEMP is not feasible, it is not necessary to search further along the path and the algorithm backtracks. For the L B formulation, as long as any two winning bids in TEMP do not share an item, the TEMP is feasible. However, in L R formulation, validating the feasibility of TEMP is equal to answering the question: Given a set of bids in TEMP with constraints, does a schedule exist that allocates the operations of bids on the resources such that all constraints are satisfied? This decision problem is a job shop Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) [16] , which is known to be NP-complete [17] . We will propose a constraint-directed search algorithm for L R feasibility checking later in this section. The BBS is invoked by calling BRANCH-BOUND-SCHEDULING (bids). The algorithm is described as following:where CHECK-FEASIBILITY (TEMP) is the subalgorithm for the feasibility checking (which will be described in the following section) and SELECT-UNASSIGNED-BID (AV ) is the subalgorithm that implements the bid ordering heuristics (which will be described in Section III-C).
Algorithm 1 function BRANCH-BOUND-SCHEDULING (bids) returns solution T EMP = ∅, T EMP
* = ∅, and sum
B. Constraint-Based Feasibility Validation
We describe the constraint-based feasibility validation algorithm based on a disjunctive graph representation of the job shop CSP. Consider a directed graph G with a set of nodes N and two sets of arcs A and B. A node corresponds to an operation o j,k and its set of eligible resources, denoted by e(o j,k ). The set of eligible resources of o j,k is a set of resources which has the capability of processing o j,k . A node for o j,k and e(o j,k ) is denoted by (e(o j,k ), o j,k ) . In job shop CSP, |e(o j,k )| = 1, i.e., only one resource is capable of processing a specific operation. We can have a one-to-one mapping from e(o j,k ) to a specific resource. For example, in Fig. 3, e(o 1,1 ) = R 1 . The set of conjunctive arcs A (solid arcs in Fig. 3 ) rep- (o j,k ) . Two operations that belong to two different jobs and that have to be processed on the same resource are connected by two disjunctive arcs (dashed arcs in Fig. 3 ) that go in opposite directions. The disjunctive arcs B form m cliques of double arcs, one clique for each resource. All operations in the same clique have to be done on the same resource. All arcs emanating from a node have as length the processing time of the operation that is represented by that node. In addition, there is a source U (representing time zero) and a sink V (representing an upper bound T of the minimal makespan of the problem), which are dummy nodes. The first operation of each job is connected to U by a conjunctive arc emanating from U with as length the release time of that job. The last operation of each job is connected to V by a conjunctive arc emanating to V with as length of p j,n j + T − d j . This graph is denoted by G = (N, A, B) . A feasible schedule of job shop CSP corresponds to a selection of one disjunctive arc from each pair such that the resulting directed graph G = (N, A, B) is acyclic and the longest path in G from the source U to the sink V is not longer than T , where B denotes the subset of the selected disjunctive arcs. Fig. 2 shows an example of the disjunctive graph representation of a small job shop CSP.
By modeling each disjunctive arc pair in B as a variable and the two opposite directions as two possible values, this problem can be solved by a constraint-directed backtrack search procedure. The solution is incrementally extended through the repeated binding of a direction to unconstrained disjunctive arc pairs. Usually, a constraint-directed search procedure consists of propagators, heuristic-commitment techniques and retraction techniques. The feasibility validation algorithm integrates Constraint-Based Analysis (a propagator, developed in [18] , Precedence Constraint Posting (a commitment heuristic, developed in [16] , and a chronological backtracking. The validation function is invoked by calling CHECK-FEASIBILITY (bids). 
Algorithm 2 function CHECK-FEASIBILITY (bids) returns
for each direction in direction-sequence do commit direction to pair result ← BACKTRACKING (G) if result = failure then return pass de-commit direction to pair return failure.
C. Bid Ordering Heuristics
The performance of BBS can be improved by incorporating bid ordering heuristics in the function SELECT-UNASSIGNED-BID (AV ). We give bids that contribute more to the revenue (have higher bidding prices), and higher flexibility (with less constraints) more weight. It is clear that the price of bids is a measure of contribution to the revenue. We use the flexibility of a bid to measure the possibility that it leaves to other bids to contribute. For a bid j, the flexibility of j is denoted by
By its definition, slack j represents the free space in bid js time window (d j − r j ). It enables the operations of bid js to be fea -TABLE I  CONFIGURATION OF THE TEST PROBLEM SET sibly shuffled around in that window. A bid with high flexibility can adjust the processing of its operations to accommodate other bids in the schedule without violating its constraints. At a search node, a bid that maximizes v j exp(flex j ) is added to TEMP.
IV. COMPUTATIONAL STUDY
This section validates the effectiveness of the constraintbased winner determination algorithm through a computational study. The proposed algorithm is compared with CPLEX 10.0 (http://www.ilog.com/products/cplex/) in terms of the running time for computing optimal solutions to a set of benchmark testing problems.
A. Design of the Testing Data
There are common combinatorial auction benchmarks distributions, such as those presented in [14] and [19] developed for L B formulation. We design our testing problems for L R formulation based on a suite of job shop CSP benchmark problems developed in [20] . Two parameters were adjusted to cover different scheduling conditions in [20] . The first one is a range parameter RG which controls the distribution of job deadlines and release times. The second is a bottleneck parameter BK which controls the number of major bottleneck resources. In our decentralized scheduling test problems, we have introduced a third parameter P to control the distribution of the prices of bids. Deadlines are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution M * U (1 − RG, 1), where U (a, b) represents a uniform probability distribution between a and b, and M is an estimate of the minimum makespan of the problem, which is determined by the average duration of all operations and the average duration of the operations requiring bottleneck resources. This estimate was first suggested in [21] . Similarly, release times are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution of the form: M * U (0, RG). The price of bid j is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution on U (du j , du + du j ), where du is the average duration of all bids, and du j is the duration of bid j. In the original job shop CSP benchmark design, M is inflated to (1 + S)M , where S is called slack parameter which is a function of RG and BK. The rationale of using S is to make sure that most of the problems generated remain feasible (including all jobs). In our test problem design, we set S = 0 because if all bids can be included in an optimal solution, the WDP becomes trivial for the BBS. By considering the different values of the parameters, seven groups of 60 problems of different sizes (number of bids) were randomly generated. The details are summarized in Table I . 
B. Experimental Results
This section reports the performance of BBS over the decentralized scheduling testing problem set against CPLEX10.0. It was reported in [22] that as a general-purpose integer programming package, CPLEX 6.5 performs very well in terms of running time for many of the common benchmarks distributions (comparable to the special-purpose winner determination algorithms, such as those in [13] and [14] . A detailed comparison between CPLEX8.0 and a recently developed sophisticated algorithm CABOB can be found in [15] .
We tested BBS and CPLEX 10.0 on the first six groups of the test problems. There are 60 problem instances in a group. These instances are divided into six subgroups according to the number of bids in an instance. The number of bids can be seen as a measure of the size of an instance. Each subgroup has ten instances of the same size. The instance size scales from five to ten in a group. We have imposed a 1000-s time limit for both algorithms. All the instances under size eight can be solved by both algorithms within the time limit. When the size scales to nine and ten, some of them cannot be solved within the time limit. For a subgroup, if the number of the instances solved within the time limit is less than eight, we do not consider the subgroup in our comparison. Fig. 4 shows the running times of BBS and CPLEX10.0 over the six groups of the test problems. On average BBS is around an order of magnitude faster than CPLEX10.0. For the instances in group #4, BBS is more than one order (around two orders in some cases) of magnitude faster than CPLEX10.0. However, there are exceptions. For the instances of size nine and ten in groups #3 and #5, CPLEX10.0 is close and some times faster than BBS. It remains unclear whether this is an experimental artifact or an indication of a more general trend determined by problem characteristics. Fig. 5 shows the performance of BBS and CPLEX10.0 over three problem groups. Instances in these groups were generated with different values of RG. Values for other parameters were kept the same among groups. It is observed that BBS and CPLEX10.0 have similar trends in V. CONSTRAINT-BASED PRUNING SCHEME While BBS performed quite well over the testing problem set, it does not in fact utilize all of the information provided by the L R formulation. As shown in Fig. 6 , the solutions of a L R formulation with n (n = 4 in Fig. 6 ) bids, can be organized using an n-level structure. A solution at level k (1 ≤ k ≤ n), contains exactly k bids and the number of solutions at level k is (n!/(n − k)!k!). BBS adopts a top-down approach (same as CABOB in [15] ). In order to find a good solution quickly, it starts with larger size solutions (from right to left in the search tree shown in Fig. 3 ) trying to include as many bids as possible in the beginning. If a solution that includes all bids happens to be feasible, the search finds the optimal solution without a backtrack. However, if a solution that includes all or a high number of bids is not feasible, before backtracking, BBS has to first exhaustively determine its infeasibility. This may lead to bad any time performance for BBS. We have observed in our experiments that BBS goes slowly in the early stages of a search.
In addition, BBS cannot effectively utilize the feasibility checking results of previously traversed nodes to prune search space. For example, suppose that B 2 and B 3 need to use a bottleneck resource at the same time and this conflict cannot be resolved according to their constraints. This implies, B 2 and B 3 cannot coexist in a feasible solution. Therefore, no feasible schedule can include B 2 B 3 (such as B 1 B 2 B 3 and B 2 B 3 B 4 ) . In light of this observation, we have developed an improved constraint-based pruning scheme to further prune the search space using a simple constraint propagator: Any solution that includes an infeasible solution is also infeasible. The algorithm starts with smaller size solutions and tries to identify conflicts at an early stage and use the conflicts information to prune the search space. However, this pruning scheme does not always lead to shorter computation time; as for many problems, there are no hard conflicts between bids. Even if there are some, they may have been pruned by the upper bounding scheme of BBS before they are identified. Preliminary experiments show that for some moderate size problems that usually take BBS 40-80 s, if a certain percentage (above 40%) of job shop CSPs is pruned by the scheme during search, usually a similar percentage of computation time can be saved. If the percentage is too low, the constraint-based pruning scheme can cause longer computation time due to the cost associated with the propagating of infeasibility constraints. We leave further investigation of this pruning scheme to future research.
VI. RELATED WORK
Limited attention has been devoted to auctions for decentralized scheduling. Wellman et al. [3] investigated auction protocols for decentralized scheduling. They imposed a discretization of the resource time line into finite slots. In [6] , Parkes and Ungar presented an auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling. The bidding language designed in the train scheduling auction avoids the use of discrete time slots. Bids were expressed by specifying a price to enter a track line and a time window. The WDP was formulated with mixed integer programming, with many domain-specific constraints, and solved with CPLEX. No domain-specific winner determination algorithm was proposed in this paper. In [23] , auctions over tasks with complex time constraints and interdependencies were proposed. The problem was not to schedule tasks the bidder has, but to produce a schedule of tasks that other bidders would do. The objective was to optimize the expected customer's utility before bids are submitted and schedules are finalized. Lagrangian relaxation has been used as a decomposition technique in auction-based scheduling. In [9] , links between combinatorial auctions and Lagrangian relaxation were studied in a job shop scheduling setting. In [29] , a multiagent framework that combines auctions with Lagrangian relaxation approaches to dynamic job shop scheduling was proposed. In [24] , Lagrangian decomposition-based approach was applied to web banner advertisements scheduling. A "schedule selection game" was presented in [25] for collaborative production scheduling. The emphasis of this paper was on the incentive compatibility of the mechanism rather than winner determination. While our approach is designed for optimal winner determination, there are heuristic-based distributed scheduling approaches in the literature [26] , [27] , [33] . In these approaches, interaction protocols among agents are usually clearly defined. However, the optimality of the schedules found through the interaction is not guaranteed. Many agent-based manufacturing scheduling approaches fall into this category. For comprehensive surveys in this area, the reader may refer to [28] and [30] . Auction-based scheduling approaches were also applied to wireless systems for channel scheduling [31] . Due to the high responsiveness requirement in wireless systems, these approaches deal with the combinatorial complexities of the WDP problem by either conducting single item auctions repeatedly or utilizing fast approximate algorithms. Recently proposed winner determination algorithms can be found in [13] - [15] . These algorithms are designed for the WDP formulated using L B and cannot be directly applied to our L R -based WDP formulation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The objective of this paper is to investigate how domain specific properties of scheduling problems can facilitate efficient winner determination algorithms. We have presented a formulation and an algorithm for the WDP of auction-based decentralized scheduling. We use a constraint-directed scheduling algorithm to verify the feasibility of the allocation at each node of the BBS. We have also proposed a constraint-based pruning scheme which uses the domain-specific heuristics to further prune the search space. This paper focuses on optimal winner determination. We have restricted the size of the testing problems to a level, such that they can be solved by both CPLEX and the constraint-based winner determination algorithm under a reasonable time limit. For large-scale auction-based scheduling WDPs, to which optimal algorithms cannot be practically applied, we will develop constraint-based approximate algorithms in future research. This paper has also focused only on the L R WDP formulation. In fact, we have applied CPLEX to the L B formulation of the same testing problem sets used in BBS testing. We discovered that, under CPLEX, the L R formulation was fundamentally superior to the L B formulation in terms of solving speed and scalability. The detailed comparison data will be reported separately. The current L R formulation restricts bids to one dimension, which is price only. We plan to extend this paper to multiattribute WDPs in the near future.
